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I. LABOR PRACTICES & DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS
Welsh v Boy Scouts of America, 993 F2d 1267 (7th Cir 1993),
cert denied, 114 S Ct 602 (1993)
A scouting troop declined to admit to membership a boy who
refused to affirm a belief in God as required by the constitution
and bylaws of the Boy Scouts of America (BSA). The troop also
declined to allow the boy's father to become an adult partner be-
cause the father refused to affirm a belief in God. Suit was brought
under Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000a et
seq. The Seventh Circuit held that BSA is not a public accommo-
dation for purposes of Title II, and that even if it was BSA would
fall within the private club exception.
In holding that BSA did not fit within the classification of a
public accommodation, the court of appeals found that Congress
only intended to include organizations which maintained a close
relationship to a structural facility. Title II regulates facilities and
not groups. The entity must "serve the public" and be classified as
an "establishment," "place," or "facility." Membership organiza-
tions are not covered by this statute. BSA operates in small
groups that meet in homes and thus cannot be governed as a facil-
ity. The administrative office buildings of BSA do not transform
this group into a public accommodation. BSA does not even need
its own facility in which to operate and thus cannot be declared a
place of public accommodation.
A private home cannot be treated as a public accommodation.
Owners of a home are free to refuse entry into their home of any-
one they wish. Title II specifically states that a private home does
not become a public accommodation because the owner opens his/
her home to the public. It is irrelevant whether a scout troop
meets in a private home, a church, or in the wilderness. Congress
did not intend to include membership organizations without a close
connection to a certain "facility," "place," or "establishment.".
Although construction of the term "public accommodation"
was sufficient to dismiss the case, the court chose to respond to the
dissent by Judge Cummings. Title II's private club exception re-
quires that a club have a selective membership. Although the
scouts admit a large number of boys from diverse backgrounds,
there are still requirements for membership set forth in the consti-
tution and bylaws. The scouting oath, which has been in existence
since 1911, sets forth the purpose of the group and the basis on
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which BSA selects its members. To alter the oath would change
the purpose of scouting, which, inter alia, is to, advance a belief in
God. Because BSA has been around for a long time, has a selec-
tive membership, was a nonprofit organization, and has not
changed its purpose over time, it falls within the private club
exception.
Judge Cummings dissented believing the majority's reasoning
was an unnecessarily narrow construction of Title II. He did state,
however, that the majority arguably reached the right result. Judge
Cummings' problem with the reasoning was that it would allow
other groups' such as Little League 6i" the Jaycees to exclude Afri-
'can-Americans, Jews, Catholics, or whomever, free fromthe con-
straints of Title II. Title II does restrict discrimination by
membership organizations. The dissent would not use the "place"
analysis, but would focus on the nature of the group. The dissent
also stated that an organization of five-million members cannot be
considered a private club. Thus, BSA would not fall within that
exception. The dissent would exempt BSA from the coverage of
Title II based on First Amendment freedom of association.
Hart v Cult Awareness Network, 16 Cal Rptr 2d 705 (Cal App
1993)
A California court of appeals denied an injunction sought by
Hart, a member of the Church of Scientology, which would have
enjoined the Cult Awareness Network (CAN) from refusing Hart
membership in the group. CAN is a nonprofit corporation
designed to inform the public of the destructive activities of various
cults and to offer assistance to those seeking to escape from the
influence of a cult. The court held that CAN is not a business es-
tablishment. Thus, excluding persons from Scientology and other
minority religious organizations did not violate the state's civil
rights act.
CAN operates on both a national, CAN-National, and a local
level. .The local organization involved in this suit was the Los An-
geles Chapter, CAN-LA. CAN-LA is completely a volunteer or-
ganization and has no paid staff. It sells no products and only
occasionally receives small amounts of money as speaking honora-
ria. The group does not lobby for legislation at either the state or
the national level.
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Hart was a member of Scientology who sought to become a
member of CAN-LA in order to convince them that Scientology
was not a cult. CAN-National is open to anyone and would extend
membership to Hart, but CAN-LA refused him membership be-
cause of his membership in Scientology which it classifies as a cult.
To succeed on a claim under the Unruh Civil Rights Act, Hart
had to convince the court that CAN-LA was a "business establish-
ment." The court stated that the term "business establishment"
was to be construed broadly and included nonprofit organizations.
However, the act did not cover purely private organizations and
could not infringe upon a group's constitutional right to freedom of
association.
The court concluded that the close personal relationships
among the members of CAN-LA warranted protection for the
freedom of private association. The court found persuasive the se-
lective membership criteria set forth in the group's bylaws which
only allowed persons to join CAN-LA who were former members
of a cult, family members of those currently or formerly involved in
a cult, and those who are committed to ending the destructive in-
fluences of cults. One of the requirements of membership is that
the person sign a statement declaring that he/she is no longer a
member of a destructive group and will not do anything to hinder
the objectives of CAN-National or CAN-LA.
Hart was unable to show the existence of a compelling govern-
mental interest to overcome this constitutional right. For the state
to order CAN-LA to accept members it does not want would be
sponsorship of one group's religious beliefs over those of another.
The Establishment Clause prohibits this. The California Constitu-
tion, which provides more religious freedom than the U.S. Consti-
tution, also prohibits the state from showing a preference for one
religion over another and from engaging in any religious discrimi-
nation that would hinder the free exercise of one's religion.
Murphy v Derwinski, 990 F2d 540 (10th Cir 1993)
Murphy, a female, applied for a position as a Roman Catholic
chaplain at a veteran's hospital. The Veteran's Administration
(VA) required applicants to be an ordained member of the clergy
and to have an ecclesiastical endorsement. Murphy could not be
ordained by the Catholic Church because she is a woman, although
it is possible for a woman to receive an ecclesiastical endorsement.
[Vol. 10
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When she was rejected for the position, Murphy claimed sex dis-
crimination under Title VII. The Tenth Circuit granted summary
judgment in favor of Murphy. Requiring applicants to be ordained
clergy was a pretext for sex discrimination. The possession of an
ecclesiastical endorsement should be sufficient.
Murphy did not claim that the ordination requirement was in-
tentionally discriminatory, but rather that it had a disparate impact
on women. Under a disparate impact theory, the plaintiff must
first show that "a specific identifiable employment practice or pol-
icy caused a significant disparate impact on a protected group."
Ortega v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 943 F2d 1230, 1242 (10th Cir 1991).
The defendant then has the burden of showing that there is a suffi-
cient business justification for the practice or policy. Id at 1243. If
this can be done, the plaintiff must show that the business justifica-
tion is merely a pretext.
Murphy was able to show that the policy requiring ordination
had a disparate impact on women. The VA claimed that it had a
business justification because only ordained clergy can perform the
entire spectrum of duties of a minister; for example, only priests
may perform the Eucharist, hear confession, and give the Last
Rites. When a nonordained chaplain is the only one at the hospi-
tal, patients, especially dying patients, will be unable to receive the
full range of services. The court of appeals ruled that if the church
is willing to endorse nonclergy as chaplains, then the VA should be
willing to accept them as well. The court found that it is not neces-
sary to be a priest to fulfill the requirements of being a chaplain.
Since the VA was being more selective than churches in the re-
quirements for serving as a chaplain, the business justification was
merely a pretext for sex discrimination. The VA was ordered to
change its policy.
Rasmussen v Glass, 498 NW2d 508 (Minn App 1993)
The Minnesota Court of Appeals held that a restaurant owner
who refused to deliver food to a medical facility performing abor-
tions did not discriminate based on creed. The court struck down a
city ordinance under which the owner was fined as violative of the
right of conscience guaranteed by the Minnesota Constitution.
Glass owned the Beach Club restaurant, which served its cus-
tomers both on the premises and by delivery. An employee of
Midwest Health Center for Women, a nonprofit clinic performing
5431
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abortions, telephoned the Beach Club and attempted to place an
order for delivery. The employee was told that the Beach Club
would not deliver food to Midwest. The Midwest employee re-
ported this incident to Rasmussen, Midwest's director, who called
Glass to complain. Glass told Rasmussen that he believed that
abortion was murder and would not deliver to Midwest.
Rasmussen filed a complaint with the Minneapolis Depart-
ment of Human Rights (MDHR) which conducted an investiga-
tion. Glass told MDHR that he refused to deliver food to Midwest
on "the grounds of moral conscience." Glass assured MDHR that
he would not discriminate -against customers based on their per-
sonal moral beliefs concerning abortion, and that this was a "busi-
ness to business relationship." After a hearing, Glass was charged
with discrimination based on creed and fined $500.
The court of appeals held that the word "creed" in the ordi-
nance referred only to religion and religious beliefs, not .political,
sociological, or philosophical beliefs. Thus, the ordinance prohibit-
ing discrimination based on creed did not apply to this case. Even
if the ordinance did apply, the court said that MDHR's decision
would be reversed on constitutional grounds. The Minnesota Con-
stitution contains a "freedom of conscience" clause. The clause
protects Glass' actions because the ordinance burdened his. sin-
cerely, held religious belief by giving him the choice of compromis-
ing his conscience by complying with the ordinance or ignoring the
ordinance and being fined. The court found that there was no com-
pelling governmental interest in enforcing this ordinance.
Judge Klaphake dissented on the basis that the word ."creed"
includes more than just religious beliefs and that Glass' refusal to
deliver food to Midwest was not due to a strongly held religious
belief against abortion. This was a factual finding not made by
MDHR and the evidence showed that Glass had other reasons for
deciding to not deliver food to Midwest. Judge Klaphake also be-
lieved that eliminating discrimination was a compelling govern-
mental interest.
Meltebeke v Bureau of Labor and Industries, 852 P2d 859 (Ore
App 1993)
An employee, Meltebeke,. filed a religious discrimination
claim against his employer who persistently shared his religious be-
liefs with Meltebeke at the workplace. The Oregon Bureau of La-
[Vol. 10
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
bor and Industries determined that the employer's actions
constituted unlawful religious harassment. Religious harassment
was defined as religious advances that a reasonable person would
find hostile, intimidating, or offensive.
The Oregon Court of Appeals reversed reasoning that the def-
inition of religious harassment impermissibly burdened the em-
ployer's free exercise of religion. The definition was not the'least
restrictive means available to advance the state's interest in
preventing religious discrimination. The Oregon Constitution's
guarantees of religious freedom are intended to permit minorities
to engage in religious practices that the majority.might find objec-
tionable. Those guarantees would be meaningless if religious con-
duct could be prohibited whenever a "reasonable person"
considered the conduct hostile or offensive,.
Patterson v Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, 858
SW2d 602 (Tex App 1993)
The Texas Court of Appeals held that the dismissal of a semi-
nary professor was an ecclesiastical concern over which the First
Amendment prohibits its taking jurisdiction. This prohibition, the
court held, applies to both substantive and procedural rights.
Patterson was a tenured professor at Southwestern Baptist
Theological Seminary. The Academic Affairs Committee charged
him with six complaints concerning his job, performance and per-
sonal lifestyle. After informing Patterson of the charges and un-
successfully working with him to correct matters, the seminary
voted to terminate him. Patterson sued both the seminary and its
president for wrongful termination of his employment contract.
The First Amendment protects all religious organizations
making ecclesiastical decisions, not merely disputes between
churches and ministers. The seminary is clearly a religious organi-
zation. The seminary's bylaws and faculty manual demonstrate
that the seminary made employment decisions based substantially
on religious criteria. All of the classes offered at the seminary had,
at least in part, an ecclesiastical purpose. Thus, Patterson's em-
ployment was an ecclesiastical concern and any disputes arising
therefrom are out of the court's reach. This principle also prohibits
the courts from finding that a religious organization violated proce-
dural rights granted to employees in its own bylaws or constitution.
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"Neutral principles of law" cannot be discovered to govern such
disputes.
II. TAXES & TAX REGULATION
Baylor v Centre County Board of Assessment and Revision of
Taxes, 623 A2d 882 (Pa Commw Ct 1993)
Baylor, an ordained minister, was employed as the administra-
tor of a private religious school. The Board of Assessment denied
his request for an exemption from the occupational assessment tax
levied by the school district and borough. The Commonwealth
Court of Pennsylvania' held that assessing an occupational tax on
Baylor violated the Free Exercise Clause.
The court found that Baylor's occupation as administrator of a
religious school was a religious activity and thus cannot be taxed.
The court based its reasoning on Stajkowski v. Carbon County
Board of Assessment and Revision of Taxes, 541 A2d 1384 (Pa Sup
Ct 1988), which held that taxing a Roman Catholic priest with both
religious and secular duties violated the First Amendment. Reli-
gious education is a religious activity because the religious and aca-
demic pursuits are intertwined. Likewise, Baylor's duties as
administrator intertwined the religious and the academic.
III. PUBLIC SCHOOLS & EQUAL ACCESS
Hedges v Wauconda Community Unit School District No. 118, 9
F3d 1295 (7th Cir 1993)
An eighth-grade Christian student was prohibited from pass-
ing out flyers at her public junior high school that concerned an
event to be held at her church. The school had a policy which for-
bid the distribution of all flyers that were obscene, libelous, or reli-
gious in nature. Most other literature could be distributed. The
federal district court quickly found this policy unconstitutional due
to its discrimination against' material of religious content.' The
school then adopted a new policy which was more complex and
placed restrictions on any flyer of which more than ten copies were
to be distributed, including obtaining the permission of the princi-
pal beforehand and having a designated table as the sole place
from which to distribute the flyers. Religious literature could not
be handed out if it concerned prayer, scriptures, or literature of a
particular faith, materials meant to proselytize, or materials whose
format would lead students to believe that the school sponsored or
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endorsed the material represented. The new policy also prohibited
material which was prepared by a nonstudent or concerned a non-
student organization. The district court also found this new policy
violative of the First Amendment.
The Seventh Circuit agreed that the old policy was wholly un-
constitutional as viewpoint discriminatory and found the new pol-
icy unconstitutional in part. The old policy unlawfully targeted
religious expression. Analyzing the new policy was more complex.
The court of appeals first dealt with what it perceived to be a split
among U.S. Supreme Court Justices over the Establishment
Clause: four justices believing that a school may not endorse any
religious perspective and four justices believing that a school may
accommodate or engage in religious speech as long as it is not im-
posed upon a student. Justice Ginsburg remains the unknown.
Nevertheless, so long as literature of religious and nonreligious
content is treated equally, allowing students to pass out religious
flyers will not result in other students believing that the school is
endorsing the message. Accordingly, the Establishment Clause
does not require the school to single out for censorship literature
that deals with religious worship or proselytization.
A junior high school is a nonpublic forum. The neutral time,
place, and manner restrictions in the new policy concerning the dis-
tribution of flyers only at designated times and only from distribu-
tion tables did not violate the Free Speech Clause. The court also
found that the restriction on distributing flyers prepared by non-
students was both reasonable and neutral as to content. The school
was not being unreasonable in demanding that students dissemi-
nate ideas that they have written themselves.
Sherman v Community Consolidated School District 21 of
Wheeling Township, 8 F3d 1160 (7th Cir 1993), cert denied,
62 USLW 3773 (US May 23, 1994) (No. 93-8474)
The Seventh Circuit affirmed a lower court decision holding
that a school district did not violate the Establishment Clause by
allowing the Boy Scouts of America (BSA) to solicit membership
at a grade school during school hours. Moreover, BSA was not a
state actor under the Fourteenth Amendment and thus the school
district could not be held liable for a violation of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause.
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Plaintiffs, a father and son, are atheists and were consequently
denied membership in BSA. BSA uses the school building for
meetings and puts posters in the school advertising meetings. BSA
complied with all restrictions placed by the school district. Classi-
fied as a "community organization," BSA received second priority
in the use of facilities, behind any school-related groups.
Alleged violations of the Establishment Clause in a grade
school are taken more seriously than in other settings due to the
impressionable age of the children. However, this policy did not
violate the Establishment Clause. The school treated equally reli-
gious groups (such as BSA) and nonreligious groups. Flyers from
all organizations Were distributed to all students once during the
week. The school provided a community bulletin board for the use
of all groups.
BSA did not have a symbiotic relationship with the school dis-
trict, nor did the school worsen the religious discrimination prac-
ticed by BSA. The school had neither coerced nor significantly
encouraged BSA in its discriminatory membership requirements.
Finally, BSA did not serve a traditional government function.
Thus, since BSA was not a state actor, there was no violation of the
Equal Protection Clause.
Garnett v Renton School District No. 403, 987 F2d 641 (9th Cir
1993), cert denied, 114 S Ct 72 (1993)
A group of high school students in the State of Washington
requested the use of a classroom to start a club for the purpose of
Bible study and prayer before the start of the school day. The
school district denied this request believing that access would vio-
late the Establishment Clause as well as the state constitution. The
students brought suit claiming, that this denial violated the Equal
Access Act (EAA), 20 USC §§ 4071-74. The Ninth Circuit ruled
the denial did violate the EAA, and that the act preempted any
contrary state law.
The EAA prohibits a school with a limited open forum from
discriminating against noncurricular student groups based on reli-
gious, political, philosophical, or other speech content. The court
of appeals held that Congress intended a broad reading of the
EAA so as to eradicate 'discrimination against student religious
clubs. The EAA provides that if one "noncurriculum related" clib
is allowed to meet, so must all other noncurriculum related clubs,
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including religious clubs. The court also gave the term "noncur-
riculum related" a broad interpretation because to do otherwise
would result in allowing schools to evade the EAA altogether.
Schools can avoid the EAA only by rejecting federal funding
or closing their limited open forum. Concerning the Washington
Constitution, states are free to grant more rights than the U.S.
Constitution provides but cannot restrict those rights granted to
the people by federal law.
Judge Farris concurred in the opinion stating that a state's au-
thority to maintain a strict separation of church and state is out-
weighed by the rights of religious groups to meet on campuses with
limited open forums. Schools still retain the right to close their
limited forum and thus bar religious groups from meeting on cam-
pus. The concurrence closed by saying that it feared for the future
of the Establishment Clause.
IV. PRIVATE SCHOOLS & UNIVERSITIES
Minnesota Federation of Teachers v Mammenga, 500 NW2d 136
(Minn App 1993)
The Minnesota Court of Appeals held that a state statute pro-
viding funds for high school students to enroll in nonsectarian col-
lege courses did not violate the state constitution. The Post-
Secondary Enrollment Options Act (PSEOA) permitted high
school juniors and seniors to enroll in certain courses at public or
private colleges and universities in the state. The expenses were
paid by the state if the students took the classes for secondary, as
opposed to post-secondary, credit. If the class was taken at a pri-
vate college, funds would only be provided for. nonsectarian
courses.
The Minnesota Federation of Teachers claimed that the no-
establishment clauses of the state constitution were violated when
funds were distributed to sectarian schools. The court stated that
claims involving the no-establishment clauses must be evaluated by
a two-step process: first, looking at whether the public benefit or
support to the school is indirect and incidental; and, second, exam-
ining whether the school is pervasively sectarian.
The case dealt specifically with the PSEOA as it applied to
Bethel College and Seminary. The court concluded that the bene-
fits received by Bethel College .were incidental ind indirect. The
program was intended to benefit the students, not the schools
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which they attended. The students were allowed to choose which
school to attend, and, thus, Bethel had no control over how many
students decided to take its classes. Bethel was only reimbursed
for nonsectarian courses, and it only received forty-two percent of
the actual costs of tuition, books, materials, and other fees. Ac-
cordingly, the court reasoned that it was not necessary to decide
whether Bethel was pervasively sectarian.
Felter v Cape Girardeau Public School District, 810 F Supp
1062 (ED Mo 1993) and 830 F Supp 1279 (ED Mo 1993)
Sarah Felter was a parochial school student, but each after-
noon she attended special education classes at the local public
school. The school district refused to provide Felter with transpor-
tation from the parochial school to the public school. Her parents
sued the public school on Felter's behalf under the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 USC § 1400 et seq, and the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 42 USC § 794. Felter attended classes
at the public school as part of her Individualized Education Pro-
gram (IEP), formulated pursuant to the IDEA. The IDEA defines
transportation as a related service which must be provided if the
service is designed to meet Felter's needs caused by her disability.
The transportation is necessary due to Felter's lack of mobility, vis-
ual impairment, and the school location.
A federal district court held that providing the transportation
would not violate the Establishment Clause. Applying the three-
part Lemon test, the court held that providing transportation from
the parochial school to the public school serves an important state
interest, does not involve personnel from the parochial school, and
does not constitute a direct financial benefit to the parochial
school.
Article IX, sections 5 and 8 of the Missouri Constitution did
not prohibit the school district from providing Felter the transpor-
tation. The Missouri Constitution prohibits school districts from
providing transportation to a parochial school. The court said that
it was not the parochial school that was benefiting, rather it was
Felter who needed the transportation as part of her IEP.
Summary judgment in Felter's favor was issued on the IDEA
claim. In the later proceeding, an order of contempt was entered




Floyd v Smith, 820 F Supp 350 (ED Tenn 1993), vacated as
moot, No. 93-5455, 1994 WL 163737 (6th Cir 1994)
Thomas Floyd challenged regulations of the Tennessee De-
partment of Education that required a parent home schooling a
child beyond the eighth grade to have a bachelor's degree or a stat-
utory exemption. Floyd held no such degree and was home school-
ing his children beyond the eighth grade.
A federal district court held that the regulations were reason-
able and violated neither the Free Exercise Clause nor the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
People v DeJonge, 501 NW2d 127 (Mich 1993)
The Supreme Court of Michigan decided this case the same
day as People v. Bennett, infra. The facts of the two cases are simi-
lar in that both involve parents who were convicted for violating
Michigan's compulsory education laws concerning home-schooled
children. The difference in this case is that the DeJonges home-
schooled for religious reasons. The DeJonge court held that the
teacher certification requirement violated the Free Exercise Clause
when applied to parents who teach their children at home in ac-
cordance with a religious belief that prohibits the use of certified
instructors.
The DeJonges used a program from the Church of Christian
Liberty and Academy. There was never any question as to the suf-
ficiency of the education received by the children. Applying a
"compelling state interest" standard, the teacher certification re-
quirement could not be upheld.
The DeJonges' religious beliefs were sincerely held and moti-
vated their conduct. The Free Exercise Clause protects religious
beliefs regardless of their orthodoxy. The DeJonges' conduct was
religious in nature because they wanted their children to have a
"Christ-centered education." The regulation burdened their reli-
gious belief because they were forced to choose between violating
God's law or man's law.
Michigan's interest in maintaining its teacher certification re-
quirement did not outweigh the religious beliefs of the DeJonges.
In reaching this conclusion, the court stated that the law focused on
the wrong state interest. Rather than centering on its interest in
having children attain a certain level of education, the law focused
543]
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on the manner of achieving that goal. The state failed to show that
the children faced a "clear and present" danger. The teacher certi-
fication requirement was not essential to the interest claimed be-
cause many states do not have such a requirement and various
studies have shown that children educated by certified teachers
have not scored higher on standardized exams than children who
were not educated by certified teachers.
Justice Levin concurred stating that the teacher, certification
requirement was not the least intrusive means of meeting the
state's interest in educating the DeJonge children.
Justice Mallett, joined by Justices Brickley and Boyle, dis-
sented stating that Employment Division, Department of Human
Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 US 872 (1990), required a free
exercise claim to be combined with another constitutional right in
order to triumph over "neutral laws of general applicability."
However, even if the majority was willing to find a fundamental
right of parents to direct their children's education, the state's posi-
tion passes the compelling state interest test. The dissent stated
that the majority was applying an "undue interference" test rather
than a "least restrictive means" test.
People v Bennett, 501 NW2d 106 (Mich 1993)
The Supreme Court of Michigan held that parents do not have
a fundamental right under the Fourteenth Amendment .to home
school their children. In doing so, the court upheld a teacher certi-
fication requirement for home schools. The Bennetts, who home
schooled their children, need only be provided a hearing to deter-
mine whether their home school met the requirements of state law
before they could be prosecuted for violating the compulsory edu-
cation laws.
The Bennetts decided to home school their four children due
to dissatisfaction with the public school system, not out of any reli-
gious belief. Neither of them are certified teachers. They enrolled
their children in an instruction program called Home Based Educa-
tion Program (HBEP). HBEP gives parents access to classrooms
on the Ann Arbor campus and the services of certified teachers.
The curriculum was designed in consultation with the school dis-
trict where the children had previously attended. Through HBEP
the children were provided some instruction by certified teachers,
but not the required minimum of six hours a day. At the end of the
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school year, three of the four children had standardized test results
which placed them at or above their grade level.
The Bennetts were convicted of violating the teacher certifica-
tion requirement and fined fifty dollars each.
The court denied the parents' claim. Parents only have a fun-
damental right to direct the religious education of their children.
The standard of review is "strict scrutiny"' only when the parents'
interest in the education of their children is combined with a Free
Exercise Clause claim. Absent such a claim, states have the power
to regulate education so long as the law has a rational relationship
to the state's interest in the education of children.
A teacher certification requirement was found to be reason-
able, notwithstanding that less restrictive means might exist. The
existence of different methods used by other states did not mean
that the certification requirement was unreasonable. Those states
may have different interests in regulating education.
Justice Riley dissented on the basis that the law interfered
with the parents' right to direct the education of their. children.
The dissent would hold that parents have a liberty right under the
Due Process Clause to raise their children as they see fit, including
their choice of educational instruction. This right is implicit in the
right to establish a home and raise children, citing Meyer v. Ne-
braska, 262 US 390 (1923), and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 US
510 (1925). Admittedly this right is not absolute, and a reasonable
regulation that advances a legitimate state interest may override it.
But in this case, the regulation has not been shown to be related to
the goal of educating children. Nor has the adequate education of
the Bennetts' children been called into question. The Bennetts had
done a better job at teaching their children than the public school
system.
VI. TORTCLAIMS
Marshall v Munro, 845 P2d 424 (Alaska 1993)
Marshall and Munro were ordained ministers in the Presbyte-
rian Church. They worked together in Alaska until Marshall
moved to Tennessee to accept a pastorate. When Marshall arrived
in Tennessee the church declined to employ him because of alleg-
edly defamatory remarks made by Munro. The alleged statements
included telling the Tennessee church that Marshall made an im-
proper sexual advance toward a church member, was divorced, dis-
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honest, and that he was unable to perform the job because of
throat surgery.
Marshall brought suit against Munro claiming defamation as
well as breach of contract. The trial court granted summary judg-
ment on the basis that the First Amendment prohibits courts from
interfering in conflicts between a church and ,its clergy or between
members of the clergy. The Alaska Supreme Court reversed and
remanded the case for factual determinations.
Consistent with the First Amendment, courts may not deter-
mine questions of religious doctrine or ecclesiastical questions.
Marshall argued that the mere fact that he and Munro were clergy
could not turn a private dispute into an ecclesiastical dispute.
Munro countered that it was his duty as a pastor to respond to
inquiries from churches considering calling a pastor. Because the
alleged defamatory remarks were made as a matter of internal
church administration, the courts had no business interfering in
such "core ecclesiastical concerns."
The supreme court did not adopt Munro's argument that the
statements related to Marshall's clerical qualifications. It held that
the trial court did not have to decide religiously related questions
to determine whether the statements were defamatory. If Munro
did in fact make these remarks within the scope of his employment,
this would serve as a qualified privilege. However, recognition of a
qualified privilege did not take the case out of the court's
jurisdiction.
Farley v Wisconsin Evangelical Lutheran Synod, 821 F Supp
1286 (D Minn 1993)
A federal district court held that it lacked jurisdiction to re-
solve a defamation claim brought by a Lutheran minister against a
synod. Hearing the case would impermissibly involve the court in
ecclesiastical matters.
Farley was hired by the Wisconsin Evangelical Lutheran
Synod as pastor of the Peace Lutheran Church. The local church,
newly established, was termed "exploratory." The Synod later de-
termined that Farley was not capable of leading the church through
the transition from "exploratory" to a self-sustaining church. Con-
sequently, the church was denied mission status, a prerequisite to
receive funding. Absent subsidization, the church, including Far-
ley's position, came to an end. Farley then sued the Synod for def-
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amation based on both written and oral statements concerning his
competence as a pastor.
The Free Exercise Clause strips courts of jurisdiction in most
cases arising from the actions of a religious organization. Although
the court noted that it was possible that a defamation action involv-
ing a religious organization could arise in which there would be
jurisdiction, this case did not present such a scenario because Far-
ley was challenging the authority of the Synod to comment on his
qualifications. Hiring decisions within the church are ecclesiastical
concerns off limits to the civil courts.
Schoenhals v Mains, 504 NW2d 233 (Minn App 1993)
The Schoenhals were members of the Faith Tabernacle of
Truth Church, where Ronald Mains was the pastor. The
Schoenhals were guarantors on a debt owed by the church. Upon
receiving notification that the church was late in making several
payments, the Schoenhals sought a release from their guarantee
agreement. Thereafter, Mains issued a letter dismissing the
Schoenhals from church membership and read the letter, which
contained the reasons for dismissal, to the entire church congrega-
tion. The Schoenhals brought this action alleging fraud, defama-
tion, and breach of contract against Mains and the church.
The trial court granted summary judgment for Mains and the
church, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Schoenhals' claim
of defamation centered on the statements in the letter of dismissal
supporting the asserted causes for disfellowship. The bases for the
dismissal from membership were attributed to the Bible, as well as
the church's religious beliefs and practices as expressed in the writ-
ten Articles of Faith and By-Laws. To be defamatory a statement
must be false. A jury could not inquire into whether the asserted
causes were false without inquiring into religious doctrine in refer-
ence to the circumstances under which the letter was issued. Re-
quiring a civil jury to probe the doctrines of a church and
determine whether doctrines were violated by the Schoenhals
would be an impermissible oversight of internal church affairs.
VII. INTRACHURCH DisPuTEs
Shearry v Sanders, 621 So2d 1307 (Ala 1993)
Sanders was pastor of the Church of Christ in Opelika, Ala-
bama. Each local church is operated according to the model of the
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elders controlling the money and property, as well as the hiring and
firing of the pastor. However, because no elders existed at the
time he signed, Sanders' one-year contract had been signed by the
"brethren" of the church. Shearry and Summers were later or-
dained as elders.
When Sanders' contract expired, the two elders gave him a
new contract to sign.' Sanders refused to sign because it named the
two elders as the employing party rather than the "male brethren"
of the church. The elders then ordered Sanders to vacate his posi-
tion and the parsonage. Sanders disregarded this order. Despite
the elders' objection, the treasurer continued to pay Sanders' sal-
ary. Sanders called a church meeting at which he announced that
Shearry and Summers had been impeached and removed from
their elderships.
A Committee of Church of Christ ministers and elders from
around the state met to resolve the differences at this local church.
The committee concluded that the two elders had full authority
over the situation, a conclusion that Sanders refused to accept. In
response, Shearry and Summers sued for injunctive relief. The trial
court ordered Sanders to vacate the parsonage, cease doing busi-
ness on behalf of the church, and refrain from further ministry
services. Despite this order, Sanders called a meeting with some
church members and voted to "disfellowship" the two elders. The
following day a meeting was held after the Sunday service to an-
nounce this decision. Notice of the Sunday meeting was given dur-
ing the worship service, although the purpose of the meeting was
not stated. Summers attended this meeting, but Shearry did not.
Shearry and Summers later received copies of the minutes notify-
ing them that they were no longer elders' of the church.
Finding that Shearry and Summers were no longer elders, the
trial court withdrew its injunction and entered a declaratory judg-
ment in favor of Sanders. The court held that the elders were af-
forded legally sufficient due process. Because Summers was
present at the meeting, he was given due process. This action in-
validated Shearry's position as well because church rules state that
there can be no elders unless'there are at least two.
The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the judgment of the
trial court and held that the putative dismissal of the elders was
ineffective because they were not afforded due process. The notice
during the Sunday service was given the day after the crucial meet-
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ing. Church rules dictate a set procedure for removing elders and
these were not followed.
Darab v United States, 623 A2d 127 (DC Ct App 1993)
Abdul Darab and others were arrested and charged with un-
lawful entry afterthey partipated in a disturbance at a mosque
and refused, following a'police order, to vacate the premises. The
defendants were members of the Muslim community who had be-
come displeased with the appointment of leadership at the Islamic
Center, a mosque organized as a nonprofit corporation.
Darab argued that prosecution under the unlawful entry stat-
ute would impermissibly involve the court in the resolution of a
religious controversy. In order to reach a verdict, the jury would
have to resolve several principles of Islamic law such as whether
anyone can "own" a mosque or whether Darab had a "religious
justification" to be present in the mosque and press his displeasure
with the leadership.
The court of appeals held' that the Free Exercise and Estab-
lishment Clauses were not violated. The unlawful entry statute was
facially neutral and generally applicable to all- conduct, not a law
directly aimed at religious' practice. Properly instructed, the jury
had not been asked to resolve religious disputes. Rather, the jury
was presented with the evidence relating to the elements of unlaw-
ful entry and asked to determine whether the crime had occurred.
The convictions were affirmed.
VIII. RELIGIoUs SYMBOLS
California School Employees Association v Marin Community
College District, 19 Cal Rptr 2d 572 (Cal App 1993), rev
granted, 21 Cal Rptr 2d 356 (Cal 1993)
The California School Employment Association petitioned a
court for a writ of mandate compelling Marin Community College
District to recognize as paid holidays three days proclaimed by
President Bush to be days of thanksgiving celebrating the libera-
tion of Kuwait-and the return of American soldiers. A California
court of appeals held that recognizing these days as 'paid holidays
would not violate either state or federal prohibitions against the
establishment of religion despite the references in the Presidential
Proclamation to worshipping and thanking God.
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The court found that the three-day celebration was not inher-
ently religious. Days set aside for thanksgiving are deeply rooted
in American tradition. Days of thanksgiving have been set aside
after the end of numerous wars in our country's history. The days
fall within California's definition of "holiday" because the purpose
is to rejoice over a "great national- event."
A California statute permits taking as paid holidays these
three days. This statute satisfies the three-part Lemon test. There
is a legitimate, secular purpose to celebrating the end of our in-
volvement in hostilities in a foreign land., The statute did not have
a primary effect of advancing religion because no religious obser-
vance was required and no religious belief was given priority over
another. There is no more entanglement between religion and gov-
ernment with these three holidays than there is with Thanksgiving
Day, which has long been recognized as a paid holiday.
Clever v Cherry Hill Township Board of Education, 838 F Supp
929 (D NJ 1993)
Plaintiffs challenged a school policy permitting classrooms to
maintain calendars depicting a large variety of national,' cultural,
ethnic, and religious holidays, and that permitted seasonal displays
containing religious symbols, as violative of the Establishment
Clause.
Applying the three-part Lemon test, the federal district court
found that the policy furthered a secular educational purpose, did
not impermissibly promote religion, and did not unduly entangle
the school in a relationship with church affairs. The court relied,
inter alia, on Florey v. Sioux Falls School District, 619 F2d 1311 (8th
Cir 1980), cert denied, 449 US 987 (1980), upholding a school policy
permitting religious music and symbols when presented in an ob-
jective manner as part of the cultural and religious heritage of
Americans.
IX. FREE SPEECH & POLITICAL AcTIvrIIES
New York City Board of Ancient Order of Hibernians v
Dinkins, 814 F Supp 358 (SDNY 1993)
A federal district court declared that New York City violated
the free speech rights of the Ancient Order of Hibernians (AOH),
sponsors of the annual St. Patrick's Day Parade, by refusing to is-
sue a parade permit unless AOH allowed homosexuals to march in
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the parade under their own banner. The parade has taken place in
New York City for the last two hundred years and has been spon-
sored by AOH for most of the last one hundred and fifty years.
The parade is inherently tied to the Roman Catholic Church,
although many non-Catholic groups participate.
The AOH has a rule that forbids groups from using the parade
to advance a political, social, or commercial agenda inconsistent
with the views of AOH or the Roman Catholic Church. The Irish
Lesbian and Gay Organization (ILGO) requested permission to
march in the parade. AOH denied the request because ILGO's
message was contrary to the Catholic faith. The city asked the
AOH to allow them to march, and a compromise was reached
whereby ILGO was allowed to march but not under its own ban-
ner. This resulted in discord between ILGO and some people
watching the parade.
The next year, the state Human Rights Commission (HRC)
ordered the Police Commissioner not tO issue AOH a parade per-
mit. HRC ruled that the parade was a public accommodation and
that AOH violated the Human Rights Law-by excluding ILGO
from the parade. AOH challenged this order by filing a suit in the
state trial court. While this lawsuitwas pending, two other groups
applied for a permit to hold a St. Patrick's Day Parade. Because of
AOH's exclusion of ILGO, a parade permit was issued to another
group. The state court then dismissed the lawsuit as moot. AOH
was in a dilemma. AOH could not get the permit without the court
overturning the HRC order. However, the state trial court would
not decide the issue because the parade permit had already been
awarded to another group. Consequently, AOH went to federal
district court seeking injunctive relief under the First and Four-
teenth Amendments.
The court held that a parade is a form of speech protected by
freedom of expression. To allow the city to regulate participation
in a parade would give government the power of censorship. A
parade cannot be declared a public accommodation if it constitutes
protected speech. Requiring AOH to accept participants with
whom it does not want to associate is a violation of its rights. Gov-
ernment may regulate the time, place, and manner of a parade, but
such restrictions may not discriminate on the content of the speech.
There is no content-neutral justification for the city's actions, and,
hence, denial of the permit violates the First Amendment.
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The court recognized that there may also be a violation of
AOH's rights to freedom of association and freedom of religion,
but said that it was unnecessary to reach these claims in light of the
free speech holding. A preliminary injunction issued granting
AOH the permit and ordering the city not to interfere with the
parade by requiring ILGO's .inclusion.
Otway v City of New York, 818 F Supp 659 (SDNY 1993)
This case arose out of the, same facts set forth in Dinkins.
When the court ruled in Dinkins that the city was violating the free
speech of the Ancient Order of Hibernians (AOH), Otway filed
suit to claim, inter alia, that allowing AOH to use the city streets,
city personnel, and public funds would violate the Establishment
Clause.
The federal district court first noted that no public funds sup-
ported the parade other than clean-up and police protection; serv-
ices afforded to every parade. City personnel marching in the
parade were not paid but volunteered their time. The court held
that issuing the parade permit does not violate the Establishment
Clause. A free-speech case focuses on the activity of the private
actor, while an establishment of religion case focuses on the actions
of the government. The :city's actions in issuing the permit was
neutral as to religion and satisfies the three-part Lemon test. Re-
serving the streets for AOH, admittedly a religious group, allows
the city to prepare. Religious groups have the same rights to use
the streets as secular groups. Certainly granting a permit does not
show that the city is endorsing one religion over another. In fact,
the city made it quite clear through the media -that they did not
support AOH and that it supported ILGO. Finally, the presence of
off-duty police officers marching in the parade did not constitute
excessive entanglement.
X. GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF RELIGION
Church of Scientology v City of Clearwater, 2 F3d 1514 (11th
Cir 1993), reh'g denied, 12 F 3d 221 (11th Cir 1993), petition
for certfiled, 62 USLW 3707 (US Apr 11, 1994) (No.
93-1604)
An ordinance of the City of Clearwater, Florida, imposed sub-
stantial recordkeeping and disclosure requirements on charities, in-
cluding religious organizations, that solicit funds. The Church of
[Vol. 10
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
Scientology claimed that the ordinance violated its rights under the
First and Fourteenth Amendments and sought an injunction
against its enforcement.
The ordinance required organizations to obtain an annual cer-
tificate to solicit any funds within the city, including the solicitation
of funds from a group's own members. The form to acquire the
certificate required that the group disclose the nature and identity
of the organization, its tax-exempt status, criminal histories of its
officers and solicitors, names of other Florida cities in which it has
registered, and an explanation of why any of this information is
unavailable. Sworn private disclosures of the information could be
filed, but were nonetheless open to the members of the charitable
organization. At the end of each registration period, the group had
to disclose the amount of money and property collected in the city
and an itemized lists of all costs incurred in the process of soliciting
such funds. The group had to disclose in which bank, if any, the
funds 'were being held; and to what use the money would be put.
Donations from members of the group could be made in sworn
private statements.
The city clerk had the power to determine whether the re-
quirements were met. If the clerk determined they were not met,
the city attorney had authority to investigate and prosecute any
noncomplying group. This authority entailed the power to sub-
poena documents, including the private statements. Failure to ful-
fill these obligations was a criminal offense.,
The Eleventh Circuit applied the three-part Lemon test.
There was sufficient evidence to'deny the city's motion for sum-
mary judgment. Scientology presented evidence that the city had
singled out Scientology for this burdensome regulation. There was
also evidence that the ordinance was passed with the purpose of
driving Scientology from the city, where it maintained one of its
largest headquarters.
Despite the ordinance being facially neutral, the court of ap-
peals found that the recordkeeping and disclosure requirements
fostered excessive entanglement with religion. The ordinance em-
powered a group's members to view the private statements on file,
thereby enabling continuous surveillance over the group. The city
did not have the authority to give citizens power that they did not
have under the rules of the church. This ordinance took power
from the church administration and passed it to the laity. This is
forbidden by the Establishment Clause. The claims relating to the
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public financial, operational, and organizational disclosures, as well
as the private statement procedures, essentially involved ecclesias-
tical disputes between church and laity. The city should abstain
from getting involved in such matters.
Because soliciting contributions was an important aspect of
free speech, this was a "hybrid" case combining speech and free
exercise. Hence, Employment Division, Department of Human Re-
sources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 US 872 (1990), did not apply.
Strict scrutiny was the standard of review. The court found a com-
pelling interest in protecting church members from fraudulent so-
licitation of funds. Funds may be ill-gotten although later used for
legitimate religious purposes. Nevertheless, a compelling interest
only exists when affirmative misrepresentations are made regard-
ing the use of the money solicited. Thus, there was no compelling
interest when the members were not told how the funds would be
used. Except for the limited prospective disclosure requirements,
this ordinance had no legitimate purpose and was not narrowly tai-
lored to achieve its purpose. The disclosure provisions, with the
exception of the limited prospective disclosure requirements, vio-
lated the Free Exercise Clause.
The ordinance also regulated refund policies offered by a
group to contributors. The city had a compelling interest in
preventing fraud upon church members, and this provision was
narrowly tailored to accomplish that end. The provision requiring
that a written refund policy be provided to members to whom a
refund promise was made withstood strict scrutiny. However, a
sixty day time limit placed on the refund policy was not narrowly
tailored and did not withstand strict scrutiny.
Barghout v Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 833 F Supp
540 (D Md 1993)
A federal district court held that a City of Baltimore ordi-
nance criminalizing the intentional mislabelling of kosher foods vi-
olated the Establishment Clause. The court held that the
regulation fostered excessive entanglement between civil and reli-
gious authorities. The problem with the ordinance was the term
"kosher," forcing courts to look to orthodox Hebrew dietary law as
providing the rules of decision.
The ordinance set up the Bureau of Kosher Meat and Food
Control, consisting of three ordained orthodox Rabbis and three
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laymen selected from a list provided by Rabbinical and Jewish
councils. The Bureau investigated a food shop owned by Barghout
selling kosher hot dogs. The investigating Rabbi determined that
the hot dogs lost their kosher status because they contacted grease
from nonkosher meat. After several warning letters advising
Barghout to change cooking methods, he was charged with violat-
ing the ordinance and fined $400.
Barghout challenged the ordinance as unconstitutionally
vague and violative of the Establishment Clause. The court ap-
plied the three-part Lemon test. Despite providing a substantial
religious benefit to a particular religious group, the court held that
the ordinance had the valid secular purpose of preventing fraud.
However, the ordinance' directly and substantially entangled the
government in matters of the Jewish faith. The ordinance set up a
wholly religious standard for governing behavior and utilized reli-
gious groups and persons to judge the enforcement of the standard.
Courts could decide what was, and what was not, "kosher" under
Hebrew dietary laws. Nor could the city use religious leaders to
enforce the ordinance according to their knowledge of religious
law. Further, the ordinance required continued monitoring of reli-
gious practices.
The ordinance also failed on the second prong of Lemon be-
cause the ordinance represented the city's endorsement of Ortho-
dox Judaism. Violations of religious laws were held to be
violations of the city's laws. This advanced the cause of Orthodox
Judaism, to which Conservative and Reformed Jews might object.
XI. GovERNMENT BENEFITS & EXEMPTIONS FOR RELIGION
Henry v Life Haven, Inc, 1993 WL 182313 (Conn Super Ct
1993)
Life Haven, Inc., was a nonprofit corporation operating a shel-
ter for homeless women and children. Life Haven's facility was
leased from the St. Francis Church Convent for a period of twenty-
five years. The State of Connecticut gave Life Haven over one mil-
lion dollars to improve the premises and continued to provide
funds for the shelter's operation. Henry and a group of fellow tax-
payers sought to enjoin public funds from being distributed to the
shelter. Henry claimed that the benefits from the funds were going
directly to the church. In finding insufficient facts to establish a
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cause of action, the court held it unnecessary to decide whether the
claimants had standing as taxpayers.
Establishment Clause claims are measured by the three-part
Lemon test, designed to prevent government sponsorship, financial
support, and active involvement in religious activities. There was
no basis for claiming that the primary effect of the public funds was
to advance religion. Likewise, giving money to a homeless shelter
housed in a church did not give rise to excessive entanglement of
government and religion. There were no facts presented that the
money was used to benefit the church. Hence, the court concluded
that there was no unconstitutional government aid to religion.
Cohen v City of Des Plaines, 8 F3d 484 (7th Cir Oct 25, 1993),
petition for cert filed, 62 USLW 3757 (US May 5, 1994) (No.
93-1756).
Cohen sought to open a day-care center in an area zoned for
single-family residential use. The zoning ordinance excepted
schools and churches from the use requirement, including nursery
schools operated in a religious building. Other day-care centers
could operate in this zoning area only with a special permit. Co-
hen's request for a permit was denied. She filed suit against the
city claiming violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments
due to the numerous day-care centers operating in church buildings
within residentially zoned areas.
Cohen's first claim was brought under the Establishment
Clause. Applying the three-part Lemon test; the Seventh Circuit
found that the Establishment Clause was not violated. The city's
purpose in exempting day-care centers operated in church build-
ings was to reduce governmental interference in the functions per-
formed by churches. This was a valid legislative purpose,
notwithstanding that the day-care centers were not, required to
have a religious purpose, only be operated within a church build-
ing. It was not proper for courts to determine what was, and what
was not, sufficiently religious. Such a determination would itself
violate the Establishment Clause.
On the second prong of the Lemon test, the court of appeals
held that allowing churches to pursue their goals free from govern-
ment regulation does not involve the city in advancing the cause of
religion. Education of its members was an important function of
the church. However, to be constitutional the ordinance had to be
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read to exempt only church-operated day-care centers that were
not-for-profit. Otherwise, a direct benefit would be conferred on
religious day-care centers not available to secular day-care centers.
The court did note that an indirect benefit was being conferred, but
that did not invalidate the ordinance. The exemption was an ac-
commodation to the free exercise of religion, not an endorsement
of it.
The third prong of Lemon was satisfied because the ordinance
freed government from entanglement, with religion, rather than
fostering entanglement.
Cohen's second claim was brought under the Equal Protection
Clause. The court found that separating church and state and pur-
suing goals of residential zoning were rational means of achieving
legitimate ends. The exempted day-care centers were restricted to
those operating in buildings that also operated as churches. The
requirement also cut down on traffic, noise, and overcrowding.
Rowe v Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 19 Cal Rptr 2d
625 (Cal App 1993)
Section 425.14 of the California Code of Civil Procedure pro-
vides that a court may allow the filing of an amended pleading
claiming punitive damages against a religious corporation only
upon a finding "that the plaintiff has established evidence which
substantiates that plaintiff will meet the clear and convincing stan-
dard of proof." Dee and Glover Rowe sought to amend their
pleading in a claim alleging various intentional torts committed by
the Church of Scientology. When amendment was denied pursuant
to section 425.14, the Rowes challenged the rule of procedure as
violative of the Establishment Clause.
The court of appeals held that the 'special pleading rule had
the secular purpose of relieving religious institutions of unfounded
claims for punitive damages which was related to preventing undue
"chilling" of the free exercise of religion. Nonetheless, the court
reversed because it appeared that the trial court had applied the
wrong standard of "clear and convincing" proof for evaluating the
Rowes' proposed amended pleading
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United States v Peters, 1993 WL 335812 (ND Ill 1993), aff'd, No.
93-3328, 1994 WL 236979 (7th Cir June 2, 1994).
Following his conviction for aggravated battery and robbery,
Kenneth Carter filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with a
federal district court. The crime had taken place in the vestibule of
a church. The court held that a state sentencing statute which in-
creased penalties for crimes committed in a place of public reli-
gious worship did not violate the Establishment Clause.
Society of Separationists, Inc v Taggart, 862 P2d 1339 (Utah
1993)
Taggart was the Superintendent of Public Instruction for the
State of Utah. In his official capacity, Taggart contributed $10,000
from state funds to the public school in Providence, Rhode Island,
that was defending prayer during* commencement ceremonies in
the case of Lee v. Weisman, 112 S Ct 2649 (1992), then pending in
the U.S. Supreme Court.
The Society of Separationists, Inc., filed this suit alleging that
the Utah constitution, which prohibits the payment of public funds
to an "ecclesiastical establishment," was violated by the payment.
The court dismissed the claim reasoning that to advocate the legal-
ity of a practice is not to fund the practice.
XII. PRISONER RIGHTS
Warner v Orange County Department of Probation, 827 F Supp
261 (SDNY 1993)
Convicted of his third alcohol-related driving offense in just
over a year, Warner was sentenced to three-years probation with
several conditions, including attendance at meetings of Alcoholics
Anonymous (AA). AA materials make reference to a "Higher
Power" and the need to subjugate oneself to this Power as a pre-
condition of successful treatment. AA frequently begins meetings
with a prayer invoking the Lord's name, and AA encourages read-
ings which make reference to spirituality and God.
Warner, an atheist, brought suit claiming that forced participa-
tion in the AA program violated the Establishment Clause. The
court agreed, citing the terms of probation which brought coercive
pressure on Warner to participate in AA and thus the religious as-




State of New Jersey v Szemple, 622 A2d 248 (NJ Super Ct, App
Div 1993), aff'd, No. A-25, 1994 WL 189635 (NJ May 12,
1994)
Szemple was tried and convicted for murder. At the trial evi-
dence was presented of Szemple's confession to several murders to
a visiting minister, Paul Bischoff, while Szemple was incarcerated.
At trial Bischoff voluntarily testified to the confessions over Szem-
ple's objection.
The issue was whether the clergy-parishioner privilege is held
by the penitent or the clergy. The appeals court said that the privi-
lege was held by the clergy, and thus, was waivable by Bischoff.
The conviction was affirmed.
XIV. JUSTICIABILITY/ABSTENTION
World of Faith World Outreach Center v Morales, 986 F2d 962
(5th Cir 1993), cert denied, 114 S Ct 82 (1993)
ABC's television show Prime Time Live aired a story on the
World of Faith Outreach Center, a church organized as a Texas
nonprofit corporation. The show accused the church and its pastor,
The Reverend Robert Tilton, of the following: operating as a sole
proprietorship with Mr. and Mrs. Tilton having direct access to
church funds; of lying about supporting a Haitian orphanage; of
distributing vials of water from Taiwan, claiming it was holy water
from the Red Sea; and, of discarding prayer requests received in
the mail accompanying contributions.
In an attempt to prove the allegations false, several times the
church's attorney requested a meeting with the Texas Attorney
General to present church records. The attorney general's office
refused to meet, but did demand the church documents. The
church refused to present the records without a meeting. The at-
torney general then filed a quo warranto action in state court seek-
ing production of the documents, as well as to revoke the church's
charter and dissolve the corporation.
The church filed its own lawsuit in federal district court to de-
termine its rights and privileges under the First Amendment. The
federal court issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) enjoining
the state court from proceeding with the quo warranto action. The
state appealed.
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The Fifth Circuit held that the Eleventh Amendment does not
prohibit a citizen from filing suit in federal court if he/she is seek-
ing injunctive relief against a state official sued in his/her individual
capacity.
The court of appeals also held that the Pullman doctrine ap-
plied. See Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 US 496 (1941).
The Pullman doctrine states that federal courts should abstain from
taking jurisdiction when the resolution of a difficult or unsettled
state-law question may render the federal constitutional question
moot. It is possible that the law under which the attorney general
sought production of the church's documents did not apply to the
church. The attorney general amended his request so that the quo
warranto action was not seeking m6mbership lists of the church nor
the imprisonment of church officials. The amendment resolved
most, if not all, of the federal constitutional problems. Accord-
ingly, the court of appeals concluded that the TRO should not have
been issued and remanded the case to the district court with in-
structions to dissolve the TRO and abstain under Pullman.
Presbytery of New Jersey of the Orthodox Presbyterian Church v
Florio, 830 F Supp 241 (D NJ 1993)
New Jersey adopted civil rights legislation that made unlawful
certain discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. A church
brought suit alleging that the legislation violated its free exercise of
religion.
The suit was dismissed as not yet ripe for review. State offi-
cials argued that they were not planning to enforce the law against
the church, the state had neither promulgated any regulations
under the new law nor printed the poster the church said it would
refuse to post at its establishment of business, and there was no
indication of a private discrimination claim was about to be
brought against the church.
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